Wing S5588

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY AND Transubstantiation COMPARED, AS TO Scripture, Reason, and Tradition, IN A New DIALOGUE between a *Protestant* and a *Papist*.

The Second part. Stillingfleet 88

Wherein the Doctrine of the **Trinity** is shewed to be agreeable to Scripture and Reason, and **Transubstantiation** repugnant to both.

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sto P. ac D. D. *Wilhelmo*
Archiep. *Cant.* a Sac. Dom.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY

AS TO

Scripture, Reason, and Tradition.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY AND TRANSUBSTANTIATION Compared, &c.

Pr. I Hope you are now at Leiſure to proceed with your parallel between the Doctrine of the Trinity and Tranſubſtantiation, as to Scripture and Reaſon.

P. Yes, and am reſolved to make good all that I have ſaid, as to both thoſe.

Pr. And if you do, I will yield the Cauſe.

P. I begin with *Scripture*. And the whole Diſpute as to both, depends on this: Whether the Scripture is to be underſtood Literally or Figuratively. If Literally, then Tranſubſtantiation ſtands upon equal terms with the Trinity; if Figuratively, then the Trinity can no more be proved from Scripture, than Tranſubſtantiation.

Pr. As

Pr. As tho there might not be Reaſon for a *figurative Senſe* in one place, and a *literal* in another.

P. It ſeems then, you reſolve it into Reaſon.

Pr. And I pray, into what would you reſolve it? Into no Reaſon?

P. Into the Authority of the Church.

Pr. Without any Reaſon?

P. No: There may be Reaſon for that Authority, but not for the thing which I believe upon it.

Pr. Then you believe the Doctrine of the Trinity, meerly, becauſe the Church tells you it is the literal Senſe of Scripture which you are to follow. But ſuppoſe a Man ſees no Reaſon for this Authority of your Church; (as for my part, I do not) have you no Reaſon to convince ſuch a one that he ought to believe the Trinity?

P. Not I. For I think Men are bound to believe as the Church Teaches them, and for that Reaſon.

Pr. What is it, I pray, to believe?

P. To believe, is to give our Aſſent to what God reveals.

Pr. And hath God revealed the Doctrine of the Trinity to the Church in this Age?

P. No; it was revealed long ago.

Pr. How doth it appear?

P. By the Scripture ſenſed by the Church.

Pr. But whence come you to know that the Church is to give the Senſe of the Scriptures? Is it from the Scripture, or not?

P. From the Scripture doubtleſs, or elſe we could not believe upon the Churches Teſtimony.

Pr. But ſuppoſe the Queſtion be, about the Senſe of theſe places which relate to the Churches Authority, how can a Man come to the certain Senſe of them?

P. Hold a little, I ſee whither you are leading me; you would fain draw me into a Snare, and have me ſay, I believe

lieve the ſenſe of Scripture from the Authority of the Church, and the Authority of the Church from the ſenſe of Scripture.

Pr. Do you not ſay ſo in plain terms?

P. Give me leave to anſwer for my ſelf. I ſay in the caſe of the Churches Authority, I believe the Senſe of Scripture without relying on the Churches Authority.

Pr. And why not as well in any other? Why not as to the Trinity, which to my underſtanding, is much plainer there, than the Churches Authority?

P. That is ſtrange: Is not the Church often ſpoken of in Scripture? *Tell the Church. Upon this Rock will I build my Church*, &c.

Pr. But we are not about the Word *Church*, which is no doubt there, but the Infallible Authority of the Church; and whether that be more clear in the Scripture than the Doctrine of the Trinity.

P. I ſee you have a mind to change your Diſcourſe, and to run off from the Trinity to the Churches Authority in Matters of Faith; which is a beaten Subject.

Pr. Your Church doth not tell you ſo; and therefore you may upon your own grounds be deceived; and I aſſure you that you are ſo; for I intended only to ſhew you, that for Points of Faith we muſt examine and compare Scripture our ſelves, and our Faith muſt reſt on Divine Revelation therein contained.

P. Then you think the Trinity can be proved from Scripture?

Pr. Or elſe I ſhould never believe it.

P. But thoſe places of Scripture you go upon, may bear a *figurative Senſe*, as John 10. 30. *I and my Father are one*; and 1 John 5. 7. *And thoſe three are one*; and if they do ſo, you can never prove the Trinity from them.

Pr.

Pr. I ſay therefore, That the Doctrine of the Trinity doth not depend merely on theſe places, but on very many others, which help to the true ſenſe of theſe; but Tranſubſtantiation depends upon one ſingle Expreſſion, *This is my Body*, which relates to a *figurative thing* in the Sacrament; and which hath other Expreſſions joined with it, which are owned to be *figurative*; *This Cup is the New Teſtament in my Blood*; and which in the literal ſenſe cannot prove Tranſubſtantiation, as your own Writers confeſs, and which is diſproved by thoſe places of Scripture, which aſſert the Bread and the Fruit of the Vine to remain after Conſecration.

P. Shew the Literal Senſe as to the *Trinity* to be neceſſary; for I perceive you would fain go off again.

Pr. Will you promiſe to hold cloſe to the Argument your ſelf?

P. You need not fear me.

Pr. I pray tell me, Were there not falſe Religions in the World when Chriſt came into it to plant the true Religion?

P. Yes; but how far is this from the buſineſs?

Pr. Have a little Patience; Did not Chriſt deſign by his Doctrine to root out thoſe falſe Religions?

P. That is evident from Scripture and Church Hiſtory.

Pr. Then Chriſts Religion and theirs were inconſiſtent.

P. And what then?

Pr. Wherein did this Inconſiſtency lie?

P. The *Gentiles* worſhipped falſe Gods inſtead of the true One.

Pr. Then the Chriſtian Religion teaches the worſhip of the true God inſtead of the falſe ones.

P. Who doubts of that?

Pr.

Pr. Then it cannot teach the Worſhip of a falſe God inſtead of the true One.

P. A falſe God is one that is ſet up in oppoſition to the true God, as the Gods of the Heathens were.

Pr. Is it lawful by the Chriſtian Doctrine to give proper Divine Worſhip to a Creature?

P. I think not; for Chriſt ſaid, *Thou ſhalt Worſhip the Lord thy God, and him only ſhalt thou ſerve*: Which our Church underſtands of proper Divine Worſhip.

Pr. But the Scripture requires proper Divine Worſhip to be given to Chriſt; which is to require proper Divine Worſhip to be given to a Creature, if Chriſt be not true God by Nature.

P. May not God communicate his own Worſhip to him?

Pr. But God hath ſaid, *He will not give his Glory to another*, Iſa. 42. 8. And the Reaſon is conſiderable, which is there given; *I am the Lord, that is my name*; which ſhews that none but the true *Jehovah* is capable of Divine Worſhip: for Adoration is done to God only on the account of his incommunicable Perfections, and therefore the Reaſon of Divine Worſhip cannot reach to any Creature.

P. Not without Gods Will and Pleaſure. But may not God advance a mere Creature to that Dignity, as to require Divine Worſhip to be given to him by his fellow-creatures?

Pr. Wherein lies the nature of that which you call proper Divine Worſhip?

P. In a due eſteem of God in our Minds, as the firſt Cauſe and laſt End of his Creatures, and ſuch Acts as are agreeable thereto.

Pr. Then proper Divine Worſhip doth ſuppoſe an Eſteem of God as infinitely above his Creatures; and how then is it poſſible for us to give the ſame Worſhip to God, and to a Creature? For if the diſtance be infinite between God

and his Creatures, and we muſt judg of things as they are, then we muſt in our minds ſuppoſe a Creature to be infinitely diſtant from God; and if we do ſo, How is it poſſible to give the ſame Divine Worſhip in this ſenſe to God, and to any Creature?

P. And what now would you infer from hence?

Pr. Do not you ſee already? *viz.* that God cannot be ſuppoſed to allow Divine Worſhip to be given to Chriſt, if he were a mere Creature; and therefore ſince ſuch Divine Worſhip is required by the Chriſtian Doctrine, it follows, that thoſe expreſſions which ſpeak of his being *One with the Father*, cannot be *figuratively* underſtood.

P. But where is it, that ſuch Divine Worſhip is required to be given to Chriſt in Scripture? For, according to my Principles, the Church is to ſet the bounds and meaſures of Divine Worſhip, and to declare what Worſhip is due to God; what to Chriſt; what to Saints and Angels; what to men upon Earth; what to Images, Sacraments, &c. And if we depart from this Rule, I know not where we ſhall fix.

Pr. I pray tell me, doth the difference between God and his Creatures, depend on the will of the Church?

P. No.

Pr. Is it then in the Churches Power to give that to a Creature, which belongs only to God?

P. I think not.

Pr. Who then is to be judg what belongs to God, and what not? God or the Church?

P. God himſelf, if he pleaſes.

Pr. Then our buſineſs is to ſearch what his Will and Pleaſure is in this matter, by reading the Scriptures, wherein his Will is contained: And there we find it expreſſed, *That all men ſhould honour the Son, even as they honour the Father*, John 5. 23. *Let all the Angels of God worſhip him*, Heb. 1. 6.

Bleſſing

Bleſſing, and honour, and glory, and power be unto him that ſitteth on the Throne, and to the Lamb for ever and ever, Revel. 4. 13. *That at the name of Jeſus every knee ſhould bow, of things in Heaven, and things in earth, &c.* Phil. 2. 9. If it were Gods great deſign, by the Chriſtian Doctrine, to reſtore in the world a due ſenſe of the infinite diſtance between God and his Creatures; could any thing be more repugnant to it, than in the ſame Doctrine to advance a creature to a participation of the ſame Divine Honour with himſelf? So that in plain truth, the Idolatry of the world lay only in a bad choice of the Creatures they were to worſhip, and not in giving proper Divine Worſhip to a Creature; for that Chriſtianity it ſelf not only allows, but requires, on ſuppoſition that Chriſt were God merely by Office, and was originally a Creature, as we are. But I pray obſerve the force of the Apoſtles Argument, ſpeaking of the *Gentile* Idolatry; he ſaith it lay in this, *That they did ſervice unto them, which by Nature are no Gods,* Gal. 4. 8.

P. You know, I muſt now perſonate the *Anti-Trinitarian*; and he anſwers, That *by Nature* no more is implied, than *truly and really*, i. e. God did not advance thoſe Creatures among the *Gentiles* to that Worſhip and Honour, which he hath done Chriſt.

Pr. Then you make it lawful by the Goſpel to believe Chriſt to be a mere Creature, and at the ſame time to give him Divine Worſhip, which ſuppoſes him not to be a Creature; and ſo you muſt believe him to be a Creature, and not to be a Creature, at the ſame time.

P. How do you make that appear?

Pr. From your own words; for you ſay, proper Divine Worſhip lies in a due eſteem of God in our minds, as the firſt Cauſe and laſt End, and in actions agreeable thereto; then to give Divine Worſhip to God, we muſt believe him to be above all Creatures as to his Nature and Being; and there-

fore to give Chriſt Divine Worſhip, muſt imply our believing him not to be a Creature, and to be a Creature at the ſame time.

P. But the meaning of Divine Worſhip here muſt not then relate to Acts of the Mind, but to outward Acts of Adoration in the Church.

Pr. Were the *Gentiles* guilty of Idolatry in that reſpect, or not?

P. Yes; but not thoſe, whom God requires to Worſhip in ſuch a manner.

Pr. Then the Sin of *Gentile*-Idolatry lay only in giving Divine Worſhip to a Creature without Gods command; which leſſens it to that degree, as to make Will-worſhip and Idolatry the ſame; and to blame the Apoſtles, for making ſuch a dreadful Sin of it, and diſſwading Chriſtians ſo much from returning to the Practice of it: For they had the priviledg of giving Divine Worſhip to a Creature by Gods command, which others were damned for doing without a command; which makes the Chriſtian Religion not to appear ſo reaſonable, as the *Anti-Trinitarians* contend it is. But here are four foul miſtakes in point of *Reaſon*, which they are guilty of. (1.) In making the Sin of Idolatry ſo Arbitrary a thing; which depends not on the Nature of the Object which is worſhipped, but on the Will and Pleaſure of God. (2.) In making the *Gentiles* guilty of a great Sin, meerly in wanting a Divine command, which was out of their Power. (3.) In making the Chriſtian Religion to ſet up the Worſhip of a Creature, when its deſign was to root out Idolatry. (4.) In making a Fictitious God, or a Creature to be advanced to the Throne of God. Which I think is far more contradictious to Reaſon, than a Trinity of Perſons in the Unity of the ſame Nature. For nothing can be more abſurd than to make

Rom. 1. 21, 23, 24.
1 Cor. 10. 7, 14.
1 Joh. 5. 21.

that

that to be God, which wants all the eſſential Attributes and Perfections of God; as every Creature muſt do: Such as Self-Exiſtence, Eternity, Independency, Immenſity, Omnipotency, &c. What a Contradiction is it, to ſuppoſe a weak, impotent, depending, confined, created God? And ſuch every Creature muſt be in its Nature, or elſe it is no Creature. I do not at all wonder to find the *Socinians* after this, to leſſen the natural Knowledg of God, and his infinite Perfections, both as to Power and Knowledg; for it was their concernment to bring the Notion of God as low as poſſible, that a Creature might be in the nearer Capacity of being made God. But thoſe who conſider and know what God is, and what he muſt be, if he be God, will find far greater difficulty in making Man to be God, than in believing God to be made Man. For This implies no greater difficulty, than meerly as to our Conception, how an infinite Being can be ſo united to a finite, as to become one Perſon; which implies no repugnancy, but only ſome thing above our Capacity to comprehend. And we confeſs our ſelves puzled in the manner of conceiving how a finite Spirit, which can paſs through a Body, can be ſo united to it, as to make a Man by that Union; yet we all acknowledg the Truth of this. But to ſuppoſe a Creature capable of being made God, is to overthrow the eſſential difference between God and his Creatures, and the infinite Diſtance between them. Which is of very pernicious Conſequence, as to the great ends of the Chriſtian Religion, which were to reform the World, and to reſtore the Diſtinction between God and his Creatures; which by the prevalency of Idolatry was almoſt loſt in the World: The Supreme God being hardly diſcerned in ſuch a croud of created and fictitious Gods. And this very Argument is enough to turn my Stomack againſt *Socinianiſm* or *Arianiſm*.

P. I had thought all Men of ſenſe among you, had been *Socinians*; I have often heard them charged with being ſo.

Pr. You ſee how groſly you are deceived, notwithſtanding your pretence to Infallibility. I do not pretend to any deep reach, but I ſee reaſon enough to be no *Socinian.*

P. Let us return to our Matter in hand. What ſay you to thoſe Texts which are ſaid to be inconſiſtent with the literal Senſe of thoſe before mention'd, which relate to the Unity between Father and Son?

Pr. What Texts do you mean?

P. What ſay you to *Joh.* 10. from the 30. *to the* 39?

Pr. I wonder what it is produced for.

P. It is ſaid, Joh. 10. 30. I and my Father are one; *now it is highly unreaſonable to interpret theſe words literally, becauſe of thoſe which follow.*

Pr. How doth that appear? For *v.* 31. it is ſaid, *That the* Jews *took up ſtones to ſtone him:* Which ſhews, that they look'd on him as ſpeaking Blaſphemy. But what Blaſphemy was it for Chriſt to declare an Unity of Conſent between him and his Father; which in Truth is nothing, but doing his Father's Will? Therefore it is plain that the *Jews* did apprehend more in thoſe Words of our Saviour. And they explain themſelves, *v.* 33. what they underſtood by them, *Becauſe that thou being a Man, makeſt thy ſelf God.* Which ſhews that they thought not an *Unity* of *Conſent*, but of *Nature*, was meant.

P. But Chriſt's anſwer ſhews, that he ſpeaks only of a *God by Office*, and not *by Nature*, v 34. *Jeſus anſwered them, Is it not written in your Law, I ſaid ye are Gods?*

Pr. I pray go on, and ſee how Chriſt argues, v. 35, 36. *If he called them Gods, unto whom the Word of God came,*

and

and the Scripture cannot be broken; ſay ye of him, whom the Father hath ſent into the World, Thou blaſphemeſt, becauſe I ſaid I am the Son of God?

P. This only ſhews that Chriſt had greater Reaſon to be called *God*, but not that he was ſo by Nature.

Pr. I pray go on ſtill, v. 37, 38. *If I do not the Works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, tho ye believe not me, believe the Works, that ye may know and believe that the Father is in me, and I in him.*

P. Is it not ſaid elſewhere, *That he that keepeth his Commandments dwelleth in him, and he in him?* 1 Joh. 3. 24. Would you hence infer an Unity of Nature between Chriſt and Believers?

Pr. I do not lay the weight on the Phraſe, but as it is the Concluſion of the Diſpute between Chriſt and the *Jews*. And it ought to be obſerved, that this was the end of the third Conference between Chriſt and the *Jews* upon this Argument. The firſt was *John* 5. and then from Chriſt's ſaying, *The Father worketh hitherto, and I work*, v. 17. the *Jews* infer'd v. 18. *That he made himſelf equal with God.* In the ſecond Conference, *John* 8. he ſaid, *Before* Abraham *was, I am*, v. 58. *And then the* Jews *took up ſtones to caſt at him.* After this followed this third Conference, *John.* 10. and this runs again into the ſame point, *That he being a Man, made himſelf God.* And theſe Conferences were all publick, in or near the Temple, and this laſt was in *Solomons Porch*, *John* 10. 23. a Place of great reſort, and near the place where the *Sanhedrim* ſate, who were the Judges in the Caſe of Blaſphemy. Now the force of my Argument from hence, lies in theſe things:

(1.) That Chriſt certainly knew, that the *Jews* did think by his Diſcourſe, *That he made himſelf equal with God.*

(2.) That

2. That if it were not true, it was notorious Blaſphemy, and ſo eſteemed by the *Jews*.

3. That ſuch a miſtake ought to have been preſently corrected, and in the plaineſt manner; as we find it was done by St. *Paul*, when the men of *Lyſtra* ſaid, *The Gods are come down to us in the likeneſs of men*; for he ran in preſently among them, and ſaid, *We are men of like paſſions with you*, Acts 14. 11, 15. It is impoſſible for me to think, that if Chriſt had known himſelf to be a meer man, he would have ſuffered the *Jews* to have run away with ſuch a miſtake as this, without giving them the cleareſt and plaineſt information; whereas in all his Anſwers he vindicates himſelf, and endeavours rather to faſten thoſe Impreſſions upon them, as appears by this concluſion of the laſt Conference, *That ye may know and believe, that the Father is in me, and I in him.* Doth this look like correcting a dangerous miſtake in the *Jews*? And is it not rather a juſtification of that ſenſe, which they took his words in? And in the firſt Conference, *John* 5. Our Saviour is ſo far from doing as St. *Paul* did, that he challenges Divine Honour as due to himſelf, *That all men ſhould honour the Son, as they honour the Father*, v. 23. From whence it follows, that Chriſt muſt be charged as one, who being a meer man, did affect Divine Honour; or elſe, that being *God* as well as Man, he looked on it as juſtly due to him. I pray tell me what ſenſe do your Friends the *Socinians* make of thoſe words of St. *Paul*, Phil. 2. 6, 7. *Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but made himſelf of no Reputation*, &c.

P. The ſenſe they give, is this, that he did not make a ſhew or Oſtentation of his own Greatneſs, but ſtudiouſly concealed it, and therein ſhewed his great Humility.

Pr. But

Pr. But is there any Greatneſs like that of *Divine Honour*? and yet this he challenged to himſelf.

P. But he knew what the Father deſigned him for, and ſo ſpake thoſe things by way of Prediction.

Pr. He knew no Creature could deſerve Divine Worſhip, and he deliver'd that as part of his own Doctrine; and therefore thoſe Words, where he is ſaid, *to make himſelf equal with God*, muſt be underſtood of *Nature*, and not of *Office*.

P. But St. *John* 17. 22. ſaith, that Chriſt prayed to his Father, for his Diſciples, *That they may be one, as we are one*; and that is not by Unity of Nature.

Pr. I grant it. But our Saviour there ſpeaks of a true, but a lower kind of Unity; or elſe the *Socinians* muſt think every Believer as capable of Divine Honour, as Chriſt himſelf, if they take thoſe Words ſtrictly, *That they may be one, as we are one.*

P. St. *Paul* ſaith, *He that planteth, and he that watereth, is one*, 1 Cor. 3. 8.

Pr. Who doubts but there are other ſorts of Unities, beſides that of Nature? But, doth this prove that there is no Unity of Nature between the Father and the Son? If we have no better Arguments againſt Tranſubſtantiation, we will give over diſputing.

P. I know you have other Arguments for the Trinity, but they prove as little without the Authority of the Church; as *from thoſe places where Chriſt is called God*, as *Joh.* 1. 1, 2. *Rom.* 9. 5, *&c.*

Pr. And I think the Argument from thoſe places, very good and ſtrong, eſpecially from *John* 1. 1, 2, 3. and it ſeems directly contrary to the whole deſign of Scripture to call any one *God over all, Bleſſed for evermore*, as Chriſt is called, *Rom.* 9. 5. but he that is God by *Nature.*

P. How do you prove that *John* 1. 1. relates to any thing beyond *the beginning of the Goſpel, and that Chriſt the Word, was before* John *the Baptiſts Preaching?*

Pr. I deſire any one to read the Text impartially, and he will find the *Socinian* ſenſe to be unnatural, forced, obſcure and jejune, proving a thing of no moment at that time; but the Senſe we give, to be ſtrong, weighty, conſiſtent, and of very great Conſequence at that time, when the *Cerinthians* denied the Divinity of Chriſt. The Sentences are ſhort, the Words lofty and ſignificant, the manner of beginning unuſual; ſo that any one would expect ſome great and extraordinary matter to be ſaid in theſe few Verſes; but what a fruſtration were this, if after all, they intended no more, than that altho *John Baptiſt* preached in publick before *Chriſt*, yet that Chriſt was in being before that? Which is a Senſe ſo mean, ſo remote from the occaſion of his Writing, as it is deliver'd by the Ancients, that nothing but a miſerable neceſſity could make Men of Wit and Subtilty to put ſuch a Senſe upon St. *John's* Words.

P. But they deny there was any ſuch occaſion of St. *John's* writing, as the *Cerinthians Hereſy* at that time.

Pr. I know *Socinus* doth ſo; but he might as well have denied that there was any ſuch Perſon as *Cerinthus*. And I think the *Cerinthian Hereſy* not only to have been the occaſion of St. *John's* Writing, but that the underſtanding of it, gives the greateſt and trueſt light to the Words of the Evangeliſt, ſhewing the force and importance of them.

P. Wherein I pray, did that Hereſy conſiſt?

Pr. I ſhall not meddle with other parts of it, but only what relates to the preſent Subject; and that lay in theſe things.

(1.) That

(1.) That there was a Supreme and unknown Father, who was *before the Beginning*, and therefore they called him προαρχὴν, who was the Fountain of all Emanations. *Iren. l.* 1. *c.* 1. 19.

(2.) That the World was not made by him, but by a Power at a diſtance from him, called *Demiurgus*, *Iren. l.* 1. *c.* 25. And in the *Egyptian* School where *Cerinthus* was educated, the Λόγος *Word*, was one of the intermediate Emanations between *the Father*, and *the Demiurgus*, *Iren. l.* 1. *c.* 23.

(3.) That this World was in a ſtate of Darkneſs and Confuſion, as to the ſupreme Father of all; only ſome few had ſome beams of Light from him, by which they knew him.

(4.) That *Jeſus* was a mere Man, born as other Men are, of *Joſeph* and *Mary*, but of extraordinary Goodneſs, Wiſdom, and Sanctity.

(5.) That the Supreme Father at his Baptiſm did ſend down a Divine Power upon him, in the ſhape of a Dove, which enabled him to declare the unknown Father, and to work Miracles, which returned to its own πλήρωμα, or *Fulneſs* above, when *Jeſus* ſuffer'd.

This is a ſhort Scheme of that Hereſy, as delivered by the ancient Fathers. And now let any one compare St. *Johns* Words with it; and he will find his deſign was to countermine this Hereſy by two things.

(1.) That the Λόγος *Word*, was Eternal. For the *Cerinthians* ſaid, the Λόγος was not *in the beginning*, but made a great ſpace of time between the eternal Being of the Father, and the Emanation of the Λόγος, wherein he was *in perfect Silence*, as *Irenæus* expreſſes it (*l.* 1. *c.* 1.) And ſo *in the beginning*, doth imply the Eternity of the *Word*. But that is not all, for he ſaith, *it was with God, and was God*, and was the *Demiurgus*, or the Maker of the World, and the Revealer of God to

Mankind, *Joh.* 1. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10. And ſo there was no place for thoſe ſeveral Emanations between God and the Λόγος and *Demiurgus*, as the *Cerinthians* ſaid.

(2.) That the Λόγος or *Word*, was *Incarnate*, which he affirms, v. 14. *And the Word was made Fleſh, and dwelt among us*, &c. and was *the only begotten Son of the Father*; and ſo he not only cuts off the other Emanations, but declares that *Jeſus* was far from being a mere Man. And to this purpoſe he brings in the Teſtimony of *John Baptiſt*, *v.* 15. and applies what he had ſaid to the Perſon of *Jeſus Chriſt*, *v.* 17. Now this being St. *Johns* deſign, his Words afford a Demonſtration to us of the Union of the Divine and Human Nature in Chriſt, when he ſaith, *The Word was made Fleſh.*

P. But doth not the Scripture in other places imply that there is a ſubordination in Chriſt to his Father, which is not conſiſtent with ſuch an Equality of Nature; ſee *Heb.* 1. 8, 9. 1 *Cor.* 8. 4, 5.— 15. 27, 28. *Rev.* 3. 12.

Pr. The firſt place is a proof for the Divinity of Chriſt; for the Words are; *But unto the Son*, he ſaith, *Thy Throne, O God, is for ever and ever*, &c. It is true, in the next verſe, it is ſaid with reſpect to his Office, *Therefore God, even thy God hath anointed thee*, &c. But we do not deny that Chriſt was anointed as Mediator, and in that reſpect, God was his God; but doth this prove that he that is Mediator, cannot have a Divine Nature in Conjunction with the Human?

The ſecond Place, I ſuppoſe, is miſtaken, 1 *Cor.* 8. not 4. and 5. but 6 verſe, *But unto us, there is but one God the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jeſus Chriſt, by whom are all things, and we by him.* And this is one of the ſtrongeſt holds of the *Socinians*. But two Conſiderations will take off the ſeeming force of it.

(1.) That

(1.) That the Apoſtle in his diſputes with the *Gentile* Idolaters, concerning whom he ſpeaks, *v.* 4, 5. doth utterly deny any Divinity in the Beings they worſhipped inſtead of God, when he ſaith, *An Idol is nothing in the world, and that there is none other God but one.* He knew very well that they worſhipped many, *v.* 5. *As there be Gods many, and Lords many among them; but unto us* (Chriſtians) *there is but one God, and one Lord:* i. e. we have but one Supreme God, to whom we give Divine Worſhip; and inſtead of the multitude of *Mediators*, we have but *one Mediator*; and ſo his deſign is in oppoſition to their *many Gods*, to aſſert the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature*, (not ſo as to exclude a diſtinction of Perſons, but thereby to exclude other Gods as the proper Object of Worſhip), and the *Unity* of a *Mediator*, in oppoſition to their *many Lords*.

(2.) That if this place excludes Chriſt from the Unity of Nature with God, it doth exclude him from being the Object of Divine Worſhip; for it ſaith, *That there is no other God, but One*; therefore no Creature can be made God: *And to us there is but One God, the Father*; therefore the Son cannot be God. If therefore the name *Lord* be taken in oppoſition to *God*, then Chriſt cannot be *God* in any ſenſe; for we muſt have but *One God*: but the plain meaning of the Apoſtle was, That by *one Lord* he meant *one Mediator*, by whom alone we have, in this new frame of things by the Goſpel, acceſs unto God the Father.

The third place, 1 *Cor.* 15. 27,28. ſpeaks plainly of Chriſts Kingdom, as Mediator.

The fourth place, *Rev.* 3. 12. where Chriſt ſpeaks ſeveral times of *my God*, proves no more than his words on the Croſs, *My God, my God, why haſt thou forſaken me:* For ſurely Chriſt might own a particular Relation to God, and Intereſt in him, as he was in human Nature, without overthrowing the Divine Nature in him.

P. But

P. But he owns, *That though he is to be our Judg, he knows not the time*, Mark 13. 32. Which ſeems inconſiſtent with the Divine Nature, which knoweth all things.

Pr. The Son there ſpoken of, was Chriſt, as endued with a human Soul, when he was upon earth; which could not underſtand a ſecret ſo much out of the reach of mans underſtanding, without immediate Revelation. But it was not neceſſary by virtue of the Union of both Natures, that the Divine Nature ſhould communicate to the human Soul of Chriſt all Divine Myſteries: but as the human Body was notwithſtanding ſubject to Paſſions and Infirmities incident to it, ſo the human Soul might continue ignorant of the Day of Judgment in this ſtate; both to let us know how great that ſecret is, and that Chriſt had the proper capacity of a human Soul, which could not extend to ſuch things without Divine Revelation.

P. There is one Argument more, which ſeems to prove Chriſts Divinity, and doth not; *viz. The making of all things viſible and inviſible, being attributed to him*, John 1. 3. Heb. 1. 10. Col. 1. 16, 17, 18, 19.

Pr. Now I confeſs this doth more than ſeem to me to be a very ſtrong Argument; and that for this Reaſon, the Apoſtle ſaith, *The inviſible things of him from the creation of the world, are clearly ſeen, being underſtood by the things which are made, even his Eternal Power and Godhead*, Rom. 1. 20. Was this Argument of the Apoſtle good or not?

P. No doubt it was.

Pr. Then the Creation of the World is an Invincible Proof of the true God.

P. What follows?

Pr. Then if *the making of all things* be attributed to Chriſt, he muſt be true God; but this is plain in the New Teſtament, in which the making of all things is as clearly attributed to the Son, as it is to the Father; *All things*

ſaith

ſaith St. *John*, *were made by him, and without him was not any thing made, that was made*, John 1. 3. *For by him were all things created*, ſaith St. *Paul*, *that are in heaven, and that are in earth, viſible and inviſible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers, all things were created by him, and for him*, Col. 1. 16. *Thou, Lord, in the beginning haſt laid the Foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the work of thy hands*, Heb. 1. 10. Now compare theſe expreſſions with thoſe wherein the Creation is attributed to the Father, *The world* is ſaid *to be made by him*, Rom. 1. 20. *That he hath created all things*, Rev. 4. 11. *That of him, and for him, and to him, are all things*, Rom. 11. 36. And let any impartial mind diſcern the difference. Therefore we have as much Reaſon from Scripture to believe Chriſt to be God, as we have from the Creation of things to believe a God.

P. But you do not take notice of the different expreſſions in Scripture, concerning the Father and the Son; *All things are ſaid to be of the Father, and by the Son*, 1 Cor. 8. 6. *And that the Father created all things by Jeſus Chriſt*, Eph. 3. 9. which proves no more, than that the Son was Gods Inſtrument in the Creation.

Pr. What do you mean by *Gods Inſtrument in the Creation?* Do you think one Creature can create another? How then can the Creation prove an Infinite Power? If you believe the Inſtrument uncreated, then you muſt aſſert him to be *true God by Nature*; and then we have all we deſire.

P. But the *Socinians* do not like this Anſwer of the *Arians*, and therefore they interpret theſe places, of the ſtate of things *under the Goſpel*, and not of the *Creation* of the *World*.

Pr. They

Pr. They have not one jot mended the matter; for,

(1.) Where the new Creation is ſpoken of, ſome circumſtances are added, which limit the ſenſe to it, as when St. *Paul* ſaith, *We are created in Chriſt Jeſus unto good works that we ſhoul walk in them.* Eph. 2. 10. VVho could poſſibly underſtand this of the old Creation? And ſo, *If any man be in Chriſt Jeſus, he is a new Creature*, 2 Cor. 5. 17. But in the other places the ſame Expreſſions are uſed, which are attributed to the old Creation, without limitation from circumſtances, or from the Context and occaſion of them.

(2.) There are ſome things ſaid to be created by *Chriſt Jeſus*, which cannot relate to the new Creation; for *by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, viſible and inviſible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities or Powers.* Col. 1. 16. How are theſe created by Preaching the Goſpel, when they are uncapable of the proper means of it, which are the Doctrine of the remiſſion of Sins upon Repentance, and the Renewing and Sanctifiing Grace of God?

P. But St. *Paul* doth not mention *the Heaven and Earth*, but only intellectual Beings, Angels, and Men, and therefore he ſpeaks of the new Creation.

Pr. A mighty Argument indeed! Do not *all things* comprehend the Heaven and Earth? And the particular enumeration of Angels by ſeveral denominations, ſhews that he ſpeaks of another Creation diſtinct from that by the Goſpel preached to the VVorld; for the Apoſtles were Chriſts Inſtruments in this new Creation, which they could not be to the Inviſible Powers above.

P. We have now gone through *the true and only Grounds of the Doctrine of the Trinity.*

Pr. You

Pr. You are extreamly miſtaken. For we have other grounds beſides theſe, although theſe may be ſufficient.

P. Name one more.

Pr. I will name ſeveral, which you cannot diſallow.

P. What are they?

Pr. The ſeveral Heads of Arguments made uſe of by Cardinal *Bellarmin*, to prove the Divinity of Chriſt: Who alone is a convincing Evidence of the vaſt diſparity between the Proofs of this Doctrine, and of *Tranſubſtantiation* from *Scripture*. For,

1. He proves Chriſt's Divinity from thoſe places of the Old Teſtament, which are expounded in the New; being in the Old Teſtament, ſpoken of the true God; and in the New applied to Chriſt. As *Numb.* 21. 5, 6. compared with 1 *Cor.* 10. 9. *Exod.* 20. 2. with *Jude* 5. *Pſal.* 68. 18. with *Eph.* 4. 8, 9. *Pſal.* 97. 7. & 102. 25, 26. with *Heb.* 1. 6, 10, 11. *Iſa.* 6. 1, 3. with *John* 12. 41. and *Revel.* 4. 8. *Iſa.* 8. 14. with *Luke* 2. 34. and *Rom.* 9. 33. *Iſa.* 40. 3. with *Mat.* 3. 3. *Mark* 1. 3. *Luke* 1. 76. *John* 1. 23.— *Iſa.* 45. 23. with *Rom.* 14. 11.— *Iſa.* 44. 6. with *Revel.* 1. 8, 17. *Mal.* 3. 1. with *Mat.* 11. 10. Bell. de Chriſto. l. 1. c. 4, &c.

2. From the Places of the Old Teſtament, which attribute to Chriſt thoſe things which belong to God; as *Power and Adoration*, Pſal. 2. 7, 8, 12. *Being the firſt and laſt*, Iſa. 48. 1. 12, 16. *Working Miracles*, Iſa. 35. 5. *Being the God of Iſrael*, Iſa. 52. 5, 6. *The only God*, Iſa. 45. 5, 6. *The Lord of Hoſts*, Zach. 2. 8, 9, 10, 11. *Jehovah*, Zach. 3. 2. *Pouring out of the Spirit*, Zach. 12. 10.

3. From the Places of the New Teſtament, which attribute Divinity to Chriſt. As when he is called, *the Son of the Living God*, Mat. 16. 16. *The only begotten Son of God*, John 3. 16. *His own Son*, Rom. 8. 32. *His true Son*, 1 Joh. 5. 20. *His dear Son*, Col. 1. 13. *His Son above all others*, Heb. 1. 5. *The expreſs Image of his Perſon*, Heb. 1. 3. *Making himſelf equal with God*, John 5. 18. *Being one*

 with

with the Father, Joh. 10. 30. *Lord and God*, John 20. 28. *God bleſſed for ever*, Rom. 9. 5. *Who thought it no robbery to be equal with God*, Phil. 2. 6. *One with the Father and Spirit*, 1 John 5. 7. *The true God*, 1 John 5. 20.

4. From the proper Names of God, *Iſa.* 9. 6. *John* 20. 28. *Acts* 20. 28. *Rom.* 9. 5. *Revel.* 4. 8. 1 *John* 3. 16. The name *Jehovah*, *Jer.* 23. 5, 8. *Iſa.* 40. 3. *The Lord*, by which the LXX render Jehovah, *Mat.* 21. 3. *Joh.* 13. 13. *The moſt High*, Pſal. 87. 5. *A Name above every Name*, Phil. 2. 9. *The Inviſible One*, 1 Tim. 1. 17, & 6. 16. *The God of Glory*, Act. 7. 2. 1 Cor. 2. 8. Pſal. 24. 7, 8, 9. *King of Kings and Lord of Lords*, 1 Tim. 6. 15. Revel. 17. 14. & 19. 16. *The one Lord*, 1 Cor. 8. 6. *The true God*, John 5. 20. *The only Lord*, Jud. 4. *The great God and our Saviour*, Titus 2. 13.

5. From the proper Attributes of God; as *Eternity*, Prov. 8. 22, 23. Mic. 5, 2. Joh. 1. 1, — 17. 5. *Immenſity*, John 3. 13. Mat. 18. 20. *Omnipotency*, Rev. 1. 8. — 4. 8. — 11. 17. *Wiſdom*, Coloſ. 2. 3. Joh. 21. 17. *Majeſty and Adoration*, Heb. 1. 6. Mal. 3. 1. *Invocation*, Joh. 14. 13. Acts 7. 59. & 9. 14. 2 Cor. 12. 8. 1 Cor. 1. 3. 2 Joh. 3.

6. From the proper Works of God: as not only *Creation*, (of which already) but *Conſervation*, Heb. 1. 3. Coloſ. 1. 17. *Salvation*, Matth. 1. 21. *Foretelling future Events*, Joh. 13. 19. 1 Pet. 1. 11. Rev. 2. 23. *Working Miracles by his own Power*, Mark. 4. 39. and *giving Power to others to work them*, Mat. 10. 1.

What think you now of the Proofs of the Trinity in Scripture? Do you think *Bellarmin* could produce any thing like this for Tranſubſtantiation? No; ſo far from it, that where he ſets himſelf in a whole Chapter to prove it from Scripture, he produces a *Firſt* without a *Second*. *The firſt Argument*, ſaith he, *is taken from Chriſt's Words, This is my Body.* Very well! but where is the *Second?* For no more could be produced, but this one ſingle Paſ-

Bell. de Euch. l. 3. c 19.

ſage,

ſage, about which he ſpends his whole Chapter, and then betakes himſelf preſently to the *Fathers*.

P. But one plain and clear place is ſufficient, if we be certain of the ſenſe of that one; for we are as much bound to believe God when we are ſure he ſpeaks it once, as an hundred times.

Pr. We have been all this while comparing theſe two Doctrines as to *Scripture*, and now you ſee the diſproportion ſo very great, as to *number* and *variety*, you ſay, *one is as good as an hundred*; but that one had need to be wonderfully clear, which this is very far from, ſince many of your own Writers do confeſs Tranſubſtantiation cannot be drawn from it; as *Bellarmin* himſelf owns, and he affirms it *not to be improbable, that no place of Scripture is ſo clear and expreſs for Tranſubſtantiation, but learned and acute Men may doubt whether it can be drawn from it, ſetting aſide the Churches Declaration.* But neither *Bellarmin*, nor any one who attends to the force of the former Proofs of the Divinity of Chriſt, can ſay, that any *reaſonable Man* can doubt of it; and that he muſt at laſt reſolve all into the Church's Authority. Cap. 23.

P. Have not learned and acute Men doubted of the Divinity of Chriſt, as of Tranſubſtantiation? And therefore in that reſpect they are both alike.

Pr. We do not inſiſt upon Men's bare doubting, but on the *Reaſon* of their doubting. And when but one ſingle Place is produced, which is yeilded not to be ſufficient of it ſelf to prove the Doctrine; there is much more cauſe of doubting, than where ſuch multitudes of Places are produced; and no doubt is made by thoſe who favour *Tranſubſtantiation*, but that they do fully prove the Divinity of Chriſt.

P. It ſeems then we muſt come to *Reaſon* at laſt. And for my part, I muſt tell you, *I I think that Parallel much the eaſieſt. For, that three diſtinct Perſons ſhould be in one*

individual Nature, and that the moſt pure and ſimple Being, ſeems to me to be more abſurd than Tranſubſtantiation.

Pr. Let us ſet aſide the *comparing* Abſurdities at preſent, and only examin in point of *Reaſon*, the great Abſurdity of *three Perſons being in one Individual Divine Nature.*

P. I did hardly believe you would have the courage to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity in point of Reaſon; but I ſee you are a bold Man, and will venture farther than wiſer Men.

Pr. It may be others have not had the leiſure or curioſity to examine a Myſtery believed to be ſo much out of the reach of our Underſtanding; or have confounded themſelves and others ſo much with *School-terms*, as to leave the matter rather more obſcure than it was before. But I ſhall endeavour to make things as clear as they will bear. And that which I inſiſt upon is, that the Abſurdities are not to appearance ſo great as thoſe of Tranſubſtantiation. And therefore I deſire you to produce thoſe which appear the moſt dreadful.

P. I ſhall reduce all to theſe two, which comprehend the reſt.

1. *How there can be three Perſons and but one God.*
2. *How theſe can agree in a third, and not agree among themſelves.*

For the firſt, it ſeems very abſurd, that there ſhould be three Perſons really diſtinct, whereof every one is God, and yet there ſhould not be three Gods; for nothing is more contradictious than to make three not to be three, or three to be but one.

Pr. I hope now you will give me leave to make an Anſwer to your Difficulty, as diſtinct as poſſible. We do not ſay, that three Perſons are but one Perſon, or that one Nature is three Natures; but that there are three Perſons in one Nature. If therefore one Individual Nature be commu-

communicable to three Perſons, there is no appearance of Abſurdity in this Doctrine. And on the other ſide, it will be impoſſible there ſhould be three Gods, where there is one and the ſame Individual Nature; for three Gods muſt have three ſeveral Divine Natures, ſince it is the Divine Eſſence which makes a God. But to make this more plain, Do you make any difference between *Nature* and *Perſon?*

P. Yes.

Pr. Wherein lies it?

P. Excuſe me, Sir, for you have undertaken to explain theſe things.

Pr. I will begin with *Perſon.* Which Name was originally taken among the *Romans* from ſome remarkable diſtinction of one from another; either by ſome outward appearance, as a Vizard or Habit, or ſome particular Quality or Diſpoſition. And from hence it came to be applied to thoſe inward Properties, whereby one Intelligent Being is diſtinguiſhed from another; and from thoſe Properties, to the Perſon who had them. Thus *Perſon* is uſed even by *Tully* himſelf, at leaſt twenty times in his Books of Rhetorick: and the old Civil Law ſpeaks of *Perſonal Rights* and *Perſonal Actions.* So that the Criticks, ſuch as *Valla,* and others, had no cauſe to find fault with *Boethius,* for applying the Notion of a *Perſon,* to an *intelligent Being ſubſiſting by it ſelf,* (and ſo the Soul is no Perſon in Men, but the Man conſiſting of Soul and Body) *having ſome incommunicable Properties belonging to him.* Therefore I cannot but wonder at the niceneſs of ſome late Men, who would have the Names of *Perſon,* and *Hypoſtaſis,* and *Trinity,* to be laid aſide; ſince themſelves confeſs *Boëthius* his definition of a Perſon to be true enough; but they ſay, *it belongs to the Creatures, and not to God, for it would make three Gods.* Which is to ſuppoſe, without proving it, that the Divine Nature can commu-

communicate it ſelf after no other manner than a created Nature can.

This is now to be more ſtrictly enquired into. And it is very well obſerved by *Boëthius*, *de Trin. l.* 1. *Principium pluralitatis alteritas eſt: That Diverſity is the Reaſon of Plurality:* And therefore in the Trinity, ſo far as they are different, they are three, *i. e.* in regard of *Perſonal Properties and Relations*; but ſo far as they agree, they are but ONE, that is, as to the Divine Nature.

It is very true, that according to Arithmetick, *Three cannot be One, nor One Three*; but we muſt diſtinguiſh between the bare Numeration, and the Things numbred. The repetition of *three Units*, certainly makes three diſtinct Numbers; but it doth not make *three Perſons* to be *three Natures*. And therefore as to the Things themſelves, we muſt go from the bare *Numbers* to conſider their *Nature*. Where-ever there is a real diſtinction, we may multiply the Number, tho the Subject be but One. As ſuppoſe we ſay the Soul hath three Faculties, Underſtanding, Will and Memory; we may, without the leaſt abſurdity ſay, *there are Three and One*; and thoſe three not confounded with each other, and yet there is but One Soul.

P. But the *Socinians* object, that there is a difference between *three Properties*, and *three diſtinct Perſons*; becauſe a *Perſon is an Individual Being*; and ſo three Perſons muſt be three Individual Beings; and therefore as there is but one Divine Being, there can be but one Perſon.

Pr. This is the main ſtrength of the Cauſe; to which I anſwer, That altho a *Perſon* be an Individual Being, yet it implies two Things in it; (1.) Something common with others of the ſame Nature; as three Men have one and the ſame Nature, tho they be three Perſons. (2.) Something peculiar and incommunicate to any other;

ther; ſo that *John* cannot be *Peter*, nor *Peter*, *James*.

P. But what is it which makes one not to be the other, when they have the ſame common Nature?

Pr. You ask a hard Queſtion, *viz.* about the *Principle* of *Individuation*; but if it be ſo hard to reſolve it, as to created Beings, there is certainly far leſs Reaſon for us to be unſatisfied, if it appear difficult to clear the Difference of *Nature* and *Perſon* in an infinite Being. Yet all Mankind are agreed in the Thing, *viz.* That there is a Community of the ſame Nature, and a real Diſtinction of Perſons among Men, tho they cannot tell what that is which diſcriminates the Humane Nature in *John*, from the ſame Humane Nature in *Peter* and *James*. And it is obſervable, that as Beings ariſe in Perfection above each other, it is ſtill ſo much harder to aſſign that which is called the *Principle* of *Individuation*. In groſs and material Beings we can diſcern a number of Accidents, or peculiar Modes and Properties, which diſtinguiſh them from each other; but it is much harder to aſſign it in Spiritual and Intellectual Beings, whoſe Natures and Differences lie not ſo open to our Underſtandings. If ſo be then it appears more difficult in an infinite and incomprehenſible Being, what Cauſe have we to wonder at it?

But we muſt always make a difference between what we have reaſon to believe, and what we have a power to conceive. Altho we have all the Reaſon in the World to believe that there is a God, *i. e.* a Being Infinite in all Perfections; yet we muſt yield that his Eſſential Attributes are above our comprehenſion.

As for Inſtance;

(1.) We muſt believe God to be Eternal, or we cannot believe him to be God. For, if he once were not, it is impoſſible he ſhould ever be. And therefore we conclude neceſſary Exiſtence to be an Eſſential Attribute of the Divine Nature. But then, how to conceive that a

Being

Being ſhould be from it ſelf, is at leaſt as hard, as how one and the ſame Individual Nature ſhould be communicated to three diſtinct Perſons; nay, it is ſomewhat harder, ſince we ſee ſomething like this in other Beings; but we can ſee no manner of Reſemblance of a thing that hath its Being wholly from it ſelf.

(2.) We muſt allow God to be *Omnipreſent*, or elſe we muſt ſuppoſe him ſo confined and limited to a certain place, as to be excluded from any other; and if he can Act in all Places, he muſt either be preſent in them, or his Power muſt be larger than his Being, which is Infinite; but after this, we have not a Power to conceive how a Being ſhould be preſent in the whole World, and not to be extended; and if it be extended, how it ſhould be uncapable of being divided into Parts; which is certainly repugnant to the Divine Nature. I therefore produce theſe two Inſtances, to let the *Antitrinitarians* ſee, that what they object in Point of Reaſon as to the Incomprehenſibility of the Myſtery of the Trinity, will in conſequence overthrow the Divine Nature. But as there is the higheſt Reaſon to believe there is a God, tho we cannot comprehend his Perfections; ſo there may be great Reaſon to believe the Doctrine of the Trinity, tho we cannot comprehend the manner of it.

P. I had thought you intended to explain the Myſtery of it, and now you tell us it is *Incomprehenſible.*

Pr. It is a good ſtep to our believing it, to make it plain, that the Difficulty of our Conception ought not to hinder our Faith. And I have made ſome advance towards the explication of it, by ſhewing, that ſince Mankind are agreed about the difference between *Nature* and *Perſon*, the whole Difficulty comes to this, that the ſame common Nature in Mankind makes three Perſons; but that it is the ſame Individual Nature in all the Perſons of the Trinity.

And

And now let us conſider the Infinite Perfection and Simplicity of the Divine Nature; and we ſhall think it unreaſonable that it ſhould be ſo bounded as to the manner of its Communication, as the Nature of Man is. Every Individual Man hath not only Individual Properties, but an Individual Nature, *i. e.* the common Nature of Man, limited by ſome unaccountable Principle, that doth make him different from all other Men having the ſame Nature with himſelf. The Difficulty then doth not lie in a *Community* of *Nature*, and a *Diſtinction* of *Perſons*, for that is granted among Men, but in *the Unity of Nature* with the *difference* of *Perſons*. And ſuppoſing the Divine Nature to be infinite in its Perfection, I do not ſee how it is capable of being bounded, as the common Nature of Man in Individuals is; and if it be not capable of being bounded and limited, it muſt diffuſe it ſelf into all the Perſons in the ſame individual manner; and ſo this Doctrine of the *Trinity* is not repugnant to *Reaſon*.

P. But what ſay you to the *Athanaſian Creed*; is not that repugnant to humane Reaſon?

Pr. I think not; but that it is a juſt Explication of the Doctrine of the *Trinity* rightly underſtood.

P. I ſee now you are upon hard Points, you will ſtick at nothing, and *Tranſubſtantiation* it ſelf will down with you anon.

Pr. I doubt that; but at preſent we are upon the *Athanaſian Creed*. And I deſire but one Principle to clear it, which follows from what is ſaid already, *viz.* That what is affirmed of the Divine Nature, as ſuch, muſt be common to all three Perſons; but whatever is affirmed of the ſeveral Perſons, as ſuch, muſt be peculiar to themſelves. Now this is a clear Principle of Reaſon, and hath no appearance of abſurdity in it. And from hence the *Athanaſian Creed* will eaſily be cleared. For *Eternity*, *Incomprehenſibility*, *Omnipotency*, belonging to the Divine

Nature, as ſuch, we ought to ſay, *That they are not three Eternals, three Incomprehenſibles, three Almighties, but One Eternal, One Incomprehenſible, One Almighty.* Becauſe the Attributes belonging to the Perſons, by reaſon of the Divine Nature, and the Attributes being really the ſame with it, the Nature is the proper Subject of them; which being but One, we are not to diſtinguiſh them as to *Eſſential Attributes*, but only as to *Perſonal Relations* and *Properties*.

P. But if the Three Perſons be *Coëternal*, how is it poſſible to conceive there ſhould not be *three Eternals?*

Pr. This ſeems the hardeſt Expreſſion in the whole Creed; but it is to be interpreted by the Scope and Deſign of it: Which is, that the *Eſſential Attributes* are not to be diſtinguiſhed, though the *Perſons* be. And ſo *Eternity* is not taken as a *Perſonal Attribute*, but as *Eſſential*; and ſo they are not *three Eternals*, but *one Eternal*. And the great Deſign of the Creed was, to ſhew, that the Chriſtian Church did not believe ſuch a Trinity as conſiſted of *three Perſons*, *unequal* and different in *Nature*, and *Subſtance*, and *Duration*.

P. But what ſay you to the damning all thoſe who do not believe it, in the beginning and end of it?

Pr. This is off from our Buſineſs. But to let you ſee I will not avoid the Difficulties you offer, I will give an Anſwer even to this. The meaning is not, that every one is damned who doth not conceive aright of the Difference of Nature and Perſon in the Trinity, or of the Eſſential and Perſonal Attributes; but that thoſe who ſet up in oppoſition to it the worſhip of a meer Creature as God, or the worſhip of more Gods than one, or who wilfully reject this Article of the Chriſtian Faith, when it is duly propoſed to them, are guilty of a damning Sin. For even the diſbelief of Chriſtianity it ſelf, is not ſuppoſed to be the Cauſe of Mens Damnation, but where the Doctrine

of

of the Goſpel hath been propoſed in a way of Credibility. If when this Doctrine of the *Trinity* is propoſed to Mens Minds, they will not conſider it, nor weigh the Arguments on both ſides impartially, but with ſcorn and contempt reject it, and endeavour to bring reproach upon Chriſtianity for the ſake of it, and diſturb the Peace of the Church about it; ſuch cannot be ſaid to receive or *believe it faithfully*, and by ſuch Sins they do run the hazard of *periſhing everlaſtingly*.

P. I ſee you have a mind to ſmooth every thing relating to the *Trinity*, I wiſh you would do the ſame about *Tranſubſtantiation*. But yet you have not anſwer'd the other great Difficulty in Point of Reaſon, *viz. That thoſe things which agree or diſagree in a third, muſt agree or diſagree one with the other*. And therefore if the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghoſt God; then the Father muſt be Son and Holy Ghoſt, and the Son and Holy Ghoſt muſt be the Father. If not, then they are really the ſame, and really diſtinct; the ſame as to Eſſence, diſtinct as to Perſons; and ſo they are the ſame, and not the ſame, which is a Contradiction.

Pr. And now I think you have drawn out the moſt refined Spirits of *Socinianiſm*, to make the Doctrine of *the Trinity* and *Tranſubſtantiation* parallel, becauſe your ſay, it implies a Contradiction; which is the neareſt Parallel you have yet offered at. But this terrible Argument is grounded on the ſame Suppoſition, *viz.* That the Divine Eſſence is no more capable of communicating it ſelf to three diſtinct Perſons, than any created Being is. The Reaſon of that Axiom being, that created Things, by reaſon of their finite Nature, cannot diffuſe or communicate themſelves to more than one; and therefore thoſe which agree in a Third, muſt agree together; but ſuppoſing it poſſible that the ſame finite Nature could extend it ſelf to ſeveral Individuals, it would be preſently anſwered,

the *Axiom* did hold only, where they did adequately and reciprocally agree, and not where they did agree only in Eſſence, but differ'd in the manner of Subſiſtence. For where a different manner of Subſiſtence is ſuppoſed poſſible, in the ſame Individual Nature, the Agreement in that cannot take away that Difference which is conſiſtent with it; which we attribute to the unlimitedneſs and perfection of the Divine Nature.

P. But you can bring no other Inſtance but the thing in Queſtion; and therefore this is a *Petitio Principii*, or taking that for granted which is in Diſpute.

Pr. I do not think it to be ſo, where the Reaſon is aſſigned from the peculiar Properties of the Divine Nature, to which there can be no parallel. And I think it very unreaſonable in the *Socinians*, to ſend us to created Beings for the Rules and Meaſures of our Judgment concerning a Being acknowledged to be Infinite.

P. Are not the Divine Perſons Infinite, as well as the Divine Nature? and therefore as created Perſons do take in the whole Nature, ſo infinite Perſons will do the infinite Nature.

Pr. No queſtion, but the *Perſons* are infinite in regard of the *Nature* which is ſo; but if an infinite Nature be communicable to more Perſons than One, every ſuch Perſon cannot appropriate the whole Nature to it ſelf.

P. If the difference be on the account of Infinity, then there muſt be an infinite number of Perſons in the Divine Eſſence.

Pr. I anſwer, that infiniteneſs of Number is no Perfection; and as to the number of Perſons, we follow not our own Conjectures, nor the Authority of the Church; but *Divine Revelation*, which hath aſſured us, that there is but *one God*, and yet *there are three that are one.* Which depends not meerly on the place of St. *John*, but the Form of Baptiſm is remarkable to this purpoſe, which joyns together

gether *the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghoſt*; without any other diſtinction beſides that of Order and Relation. And it is againſt the fundamental deſign of Chriſtianity, to joyn any Created Beings together with God in ſo ſolemn an Act of Religion. And St. *Paul* joyns them together in his Benediction: *The Grace of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, and the Love of God, and the Communion of the Holy Ghoſt be with you all. Amen.* 2 Cor. 12. 14. From whence the Chriſtian Church hath always believed a *Trinity* of *Perſons* in the *Unity* of the *Divine Nature*.

P. You have taken a great deal of pains to clear the Doctrine of the *Trinity* from any abſurdity in point of *Reaſon*, why ſhould you not do as much now as to *Tranſubſtantiation*?

Pr. In plain truth, becauſe I cannot; for here lies a vaſt difference between them. In the *Trinity* we conſider'd an *Infinite Being*, to which no bounds can be ſet without deſtroying its Nature; but in *Tranſubſtantiation*, we ſuppoſe a true finite Body, which hath its natural bounds and limits to one certain Place, and yet you will and muſt ſuppoſe this Body to be equally preſent in many thouſand diſtant Places at the ſame time; which implies ſo great a Repugnancy to the very Nature of a Body, that I can by no means give my Aſſent to it.

P. Alas! Is this it which chokes your Reaſon, ſo that you cannot ſwallow the Doctrine of the Church in this matter?

You do not conſider, that tho we allow nothing *Infinite* in the *Body* it ſelf; yet we ſuppoſe an *Infinite Power* to be imploy'd about it: and an Infinite Power may produce things above our Comprehenſions, about Bodies in themſelves finite.

Pr. This is the utmoſt your Cauſe will bear; but I pray tell me, Is there any ſuch thing as a Repugnancy in the Nature of things or not? *i. e.* Are there not ſome things

things which are endued with ſuch Properties, that if you alter them, you deſtroy their very Nature; as, to ſuppoſe an indiviſible Line, a Triangle without Lines, a Body without Dimenſions?

P. Hold a little; a Body muſt have Dimenſions belonging to it, but it is not neceſſary it ſhould have thoſe Dimenſions where-ever it is preſent. For it may be preſent in one Place *as a Body*, and in another *after the manner of a Spirit*.

Pr. You might as well have ſaid, a Body may be conſider'd two ways; as it is a Body, and as it is not a Body: for there can be no Body, where there are no Dimenſions proper to it.

P. See how you are miſtaken; for *it is not the Dimenſions which ſeem to hinder a Body being in more places at once, but its Unity*; as *Bellarmin* well obſerves.

Pr. I ſay both of them hinder. For a true Body can no more be without its Dimenſions, than a Line without Diviſibility.

P. I grant, that naturally it cannot, but *by Divine Power* it may.

Pr. Will you make the Power of God to change the Eſſential Properties of things, while the things themſelves remain in their true Nature? You may as well ſay, that naturally Man is a Reaſonable Creature; but by Divine Power he may be a true Man, and yet want the Faculty of Reaſoning: That naturally two and two make four, but God can make two and two to be joyned together in a ſupernatural manner, ſo as that four ſhall not reſult from them; that tho, naturally ſpeaking, white-waſhing a Wall makes it look white, yet by an extraordinary Power, there may be the preſence of all things which make a Wall white, yet it ſhall not do ſo; juſt ſo it is to make a Body preſent, and yet to have no Dimenſions of a Body. Is there any real difference between the

Nature

Nature of a Body and Spirit? Wherein lies it? Is it not as repugnant for a Body to be after the manner of a Spirit, as for a Body and Spirit to be the ſame?

P. All this proceeds upon not conſidering the difference between the *Eſſential Extenſion* of a *Body*, and that which *is quantitative, and hath relation to Place.*

Pr. The *Eſſential Extenſion* of a Body without *Quantity*, is Non-ſenſe, and a Contradiction. For it is to make a Body extended and not extended, at the ſame time. I pray tell me what you mean by *a Body*, as it is oppoſed to *a Spirit?*

P. I mean as all Mankind do, ſuch a Subſtance which conſiſts of Parts extended and diviſible.

Pr. Then being extended and diviſible, are the natural and eſſential Properties of a Body. And therefore, to ſuppoſe a Body not to be extended and diviſible, is to ſuppoſe it not to be a Body, which is a plain Contradiction.

P. You are to diſtinguiſh between *the Intrinſecal Quantity*, which is an inſeparable Property of a Body, and the *Extrinſecal Relation* it hath to a Place.

Pr. Intrinſecal Quantity without Relation to Place, is *intrinſecal Non-ſenſe.* For, how is it poſſible for extended Parts to have no Relation to Place?

P. By *Relation to Place*, I mean, when the Parts of a Body anſwer to the Parts of a Place: but by *Intrinſecal Quantity*, I mean, that there is the real order and proportion of Parts in the Body it ſelf, but it doth not fill up the Place.

Pr. Then you do ſuppoſe the Body of Chriſt in the Euchariſt, to have all the diſtinct Parts of a Body, with their due Order and Proportion, but to be in the Sacrament after an indiviſible manner.

P. Why not?

Pr.

Pr. Do you think it poſſible for the real and entire Body of a Man to be crouded into the compaſs of a Wafer, with all the difference of its Parts, ſo that no true Part of the Body be miſſing?

P. Yes, by Divine Power.

Pr. Do you think a far leſs thing poſſible than that, *viz.* that a Man's Head, and Shoulders, and Arms, ſhould be contained entire and diſtinct under the Nail of his little Finger?

P. Why not?

Pr. Then why may not the greateſt Body be within the leaſt? Why may not an Elephant be caught in a Mouſe-trap, and a Rhinoceros be put into a Snuff-box? For either there is a Repugnancy in the Nature of the thing, for a greater Body to be within a leſs, or there is not; if not, then theſe mentioned Inſtances are poſſible; if there be, then the ſuppoſition of Divine Power can give no relief, unleſs you ſuppoſe, that God can do things repugnant in themſelves, *i. e.* that he can do things which cannot be done. But I pray tell me, if the very Body of Chriſt be by *Tranſubſtantiation* in the Wafer, with all its Parts in their due order, then the Head muſt be diſtant from the Feet, and all the other *Organs* in their proper places; but this cannot poſſibly be ſuppoſed, where there is no meaſure of diſtance as *Place* is, and the whole Body is in a point.

P. I ſay again, there is the juſt order of Parts conſidered *in themſelves*, but not *with reſpect to Place*.

Pr. Then it is impoſſible there ſhould be any diſtance; without which it is impoſſible there ſhould be the order of Parts in a Human Body. Thus, there is a Repugnancy in the very ſuppoſition of Chriſt's Body being in the Wafer, tho there were but one ſingle Wafer; but when to this we add, that it is equally thus preſent in thouſands of Wafers at what diſtance of Place ſoever, the Abſurdities

dities do increaſe and multiply ſo faſt upon us, that it is hardly poſſible to imagin any thing concerning a Body, which doth imply more than this doth. As that *one* and the ſame Body ſhould be indiviſibly preſent in many places, where it muſt be divided from it ſelf, by ſo many Bodies interpoſing: ſo that it is impoſſible to apprehend how two Bodies can be divided from one another more effectually, than ſuch a Body muſt be from it ſelf, if it be preſent in many places at once.

P. I pray ſtop here; for reckon up as many Abſurdities as you will, they are all but the Effects of *Carnal Reaſon*, and we muſt *captivate our Underſtanding to the Obedience of Faith*.

Pr. Then it is to no purpoſe to argue any farther, on the point of *Reaſon*; and I thought you deſigned this for one part of your *Parallel*.

P. So I did; and I ſtill ſay, there are things as hard to make out about the *Trinity*, which you have not yet taken notice of.

Pr. I pray let us hear them, that we may put an end to this Diſcourſe.

P. What ſay you then to one and the ſame Nature being in three diſtinct Perſons, which *Bellarmin* ſaith, *is more wonderful, than that one Body ſhould be in many Places; becauſe the Nature is identified with the Perſons, but the Body is not ſo with the Places in which it is preſent.* If therefore the ſame Nature be not divided from it ſelf in the Perſons of the Trinity, how much more eaſily may one Body be preſent in ſeveral places, and not be divided from it ſelf?

Pr. It is ſtrange neither *Bellarmin* nor you ſhould diſcern the difference. For the reaſon why a Body muſt be divided from it ſelf, being in ſeveral places, is, becauſe it is finite; and there being no Penetration of Dimenſions in

Bodies, the interpoſing of other Bodies muſt needs divide the ſame Body in diſtant places; but the Reaſon why the ſame Divine Nature may be in ſeveral Perſons, is, becauſe it is Infinite; and therefore nothing can bound or diſcontinue it.

P. You have talked much of Contradictions; Is there any greater about Tranſubſtantiation, than that of *Eternal Generation* of the Son in the *Myſtery* of the *Trinity*? for, if it be not *proper Generation*, then you cannot infer from it, that *the Son is of the ſame Subſtance with the Father*; if it be, then it muſt be a proceeding from not being to being, and ſo *an Eternal Generation* is a Contradiction.

Pr. It is a Rule in common Reaſon, That all Attributes muſt be underſtood according to the Nature of the Subjects. And therefore, if the Subject here ſpoken of, be of ſuch a Nature, as to be uncapable of proceeding from *not being to being*, then whatever is affirmed of it, muſt be ſo underſtood, as not to deſtroy its Nature. The Term of Generation alone is not, it may be, ſufficient to prove the Son Co-eſſential with the Father, becauſe it might have been uſed improperly and metaphorically. But when from the Scripture, it otherwiſe appears that the Son of God being *the Word, was in the beginning with God, and was God*, John 1. 1. and we ſoon after find him called *the only begotten of the Father*, Ver. 14. and *the only begotten Son*, Ver. 18. we have reaſon to infer from hence his *Eternal Generation*. Which muſt not be underſtood in ſuch a mean ſenſe as is agreeable to Creatures, but as it is conſiſtent with the Eſſential Attributes of God, of which neceſſary Exiſtence is one. So that by Eternal Generation, no more can be meant, than ſuch an Emanation of the Son from the Father, as doth ſuppoſe them to have the ſame Nature and Co-exiſtence: which

is

is beſt repreſented by the Rays of the Sun coming from the Fountain of Light, if they were permanent, and not ſucceſſive.

P. What ſay you then to the *Myſtery* of the *Incarnation? Is it not more wonderful*, as *Bellarmin* obſerves, *that there ſhould be one Hypoſtaſis in two Natures, than one Body in two Places? ſince the Union is greater between the Hypoſtaſis and the Natures, than between the Body and the Places it is in; the one being intrinſecal and ſubſtantial, the other extrinſecal and accidental. And that Hypoſtaſis is the ſame with the Divine Nature, and yet is moſt cloſely united with the Human Nature, which is ſo different from the Divine; ſo that it is incomprehenſible by us, how in that Union the Natures are not confounded, or the Hypoſtaſis divided.*

Pr. Suppoſe now we grant all this, that there is an incomprehenſible Myſtery in the *Incarnation*, what follows from thence? Have I not hitherto owned, that there muſt be ſomething incomprehenſible by us, in what relates to the Divine Nature? And it is the leſs wonder it is ſo in the *Incarnation*, wherein an Union is implied between an Infinite and Finite Nature; when the Union of the Soul and Body, though both Finite, is above our Comprehenſion, though we our ſelves conſiſt of Souls and Bodies ſo united? But what Conſequence is it, if we are not able to explain this, that then we muſt admit that the ſame Body may be not meerly in two, but in ten thouſand places at the the ſame time? *i. e.* If we cannot explain the *Hypoſtatical Union*, then all manner of Abſurdities muſt go down with us, that relate to things of a very different Nature from it.

P. I am glad to find you are ſet at laſt, and that now you have a Difficulty before you which you can never get through.

Pr. Be not too confident; I have only hitherto denied the Conſequence as to the Difficulties of *Tranſubſtantiation*. But it is poſſible, that ſetting aſide the Confuſion of *School-Terms*, I may be able to give a far more intelligible and reaſonable Account of the *Incarnation* it ſelf, than you can ever do of *Tranſubſtantiation*.

P. Firſt ſhew that it is poſſible, and then explain the manner of it.

Pr. But let us in the firſt place agree what we mean by it.

P. By the *Incarnation*, I mean, the Union of the Divine and Humane Nature, ſo as to make one Perſon in Chriſt.

Pr. If this be not poſſible, it muſt either be, 1. Becauſe two Natures different from each other, cannot be united to make one Perſon: The contrary whereof appears in the union of Soul and Body to the Perſon of a Man. Or, 2. becauſe it is impoſſible that an Infinite Nature ſhould be united to a Finite.

P. How can there be an Union poſſible, between two Beings infinitely diſtant from each other?

Pr. Not in that reſpect wherein the *Diſtance* is *Infinite*; but if there be nothing deſtructive to either Nature in ſuch an Union, and the Infinite Nature do condeſcend to it, why may it not be ſo united to an Intelligent Finite Being, as to make one Perſon together with it? For in reſpect of Union, the Diſtance is not ſo great between *Finite* and *Infinite*, as between *Body* and *Spirit*.

P. The Diſtance is Infinite in one Caſe, but not in the other.

Pr. I do not ſpeak of them, with Reſpect to *Perfections*, but to *Union*; and an infinite Diſtance in that muſt imply an abſolute Repugnancy, which you can never prove:

prove: For, ſince *Body* and *Spirit* may be united to make one Perſon, an Infinite Spirit may be united to a Finite Nature.

P. But the manner of the *Hypoſtatical Union* is impoſſible to be conceived.

Pr. Let the thing be granted poſſible, and the difficulty of conceiving the manner may be as great in the Union of Soul and Body. Will you undertake to explain that to me? and yet I hope you believe it. But, let us hear your Difficulties again, which you object from *Bellarmine*.

P. That there ſhould be but one Hypoſtaſis in two Natures; and that in the Union the Natures ſhould not be confounded, nor the Hypoſtaſis divided.

Pr. All theſe Difficulties ariſe from the ſenſe of the word *Hypoſtaſis*. Which originally ſignifies *a Real Being*, and not ſuch which depends only on Fancy and Imagination; from thence its ſignification was enlarged, not only to *things real*, (in oppoſition to meer Appearances, and Creatures of the Mind) but to ſuch a thing *which did ſubſiſt of it ſelf*, and had not its ſubſiſtence in another, as Accidents had. So that an *Hypoſtaſis* was *a real Subſtance which had ſubſiſtence in it ſelf*. But ſuch are of two kinds, as the Greek Fathers obſerve. (1.) Such as are real Subſtances in themſelves, but yet are capable of being joined with another, to make up a Perſon; thus the *Soul* and *Body* have two different *Hypoſtaſes*, and make up but *one Perſon* of a Man. (2) It is taken, for a *compleat individual Subſiſtence, which is not joined with any other as a Part*; and ſo *Hypoſtaſis* is the ſame with *a Perſon*, which is nothing elſe but *a compleat, intelligent, individual Hypoſtaſis*. And in this ſenſe there can be but one *Hypoſtaſis* in Chriſt, *i. e.* one Perſon, tho there be two Natures.

P. But our Divines ſay, that the Humane Nature after the Union hath no *Hypoſtaſis*, it being ſwallowed up by the Divine.

Pr.

Pr. I know they do; but if they mean that the Humane Nature, after the Union, loſes that *ſubſiſtence* which is proper to the *Humane Nature*, it is impoſſible for them to avoid the *Eutychian Hereſy*, condemned by the Council of *Chalcedon*; but if they mean no more than that there is *a true Nature*, but no Perſon, ſave only that which reſults from both Natures; they then agree with the Senſe of the Church, which condemned the *Eutychians*. For as much as the Hereſies of *Neſtorius* and *Eutyches* differ'd in themſelves, they were both built on the ſame Ground, *viz.* that there could be no true Nature, but there muſt be a Perſon; and that two Natures could not make one Perſon. From whence *Neſtorius* aſſerted there were *two Perſons in Chriſt*; and *Eutyches* denied that there were *two Natures*.

P. What doth all this ſignify, but that the Authority of the Church muſt determine whether there be *two Natures*, or *two Perſons* in Chriſt?

Pr. It ſeems then, the whole Buſineſs wherein the General Councils were ſo warmly concerned, was only to make an *Eccleſiaſtical Dictionary*, and to appoint what words are to be uſed, and what not. Do you think then, there were no ſuch *real Hereſies* as *Neſtorianiſm* and *Eutychianiſm*, but only they happened to take the words *Nature* and *Perſon* in another ſenſe than the Church would have Men uſe them?

P. I truſt the Church for all theſe things.

Pr. Then if the Church would have you affirm *two Perſons* and *one Nature*, or *two Natures* and *one Perſon*, it were all one to you.

P. Why not? ſince the Church muſt determine.

Pr. What if you had been to diſpute with *Neſtorius* and *Eutyches*?

P. I would have told them, they muſt ſubmit to the *Church* about the uſe of words.

Pr.

Pr. And they would have laughed at you for your pains: For the Controverſy was really about the *Truth* of *Chriſt's Incarnation*, (as the Fathers proved, and the Councils determined) which in Conſequence was rejected by both of them; as I will evidently prove, if you have any longer Patience.

P. I beg your pardon, Sir, I have heard enough of all Conſcience already.

Pr. I think ſo too, to make you aſhamed of your Parallel between the *Doctrine of the Trinity, and Tranſubſtantiation.*

And methinks, for the ſake of our common Chriſtianity, you ſhould no more venture upon ſuch bold and unreaſonable Compariſons. Do you in earneſt think, it is all one, whether Men do believe a God, or Providence, or Heaven, or Hell, or the Trinity and Incarnation of Chriſt, if they do not believe *Tranſubſtantiation?* We have heard much of late about *Old and New Popery*; but if this be the way of *Repreſenting New Popery*, by expoſing the common Articles of Faith; it will ſet the Minds of all good Chriſtians farther from it than ever. For upon the very ſame Grounds, we may expect another Parallel between the *belief of a God* and *Tranſubſtantiation*; the effect of which will be, the expoſing of all Religion. This is a very deſtructive and miſchievous Method of Proceeding; but our comfort is, that it is very *unreaſonable*; as I hope, hath fully appeared by this Diſcourſe.

FINIS.

Errata *omitted in the former Dialogue.*

PAge 10. line 25, dele *not.*
18. l. 2, dele *not.*
14. Marg. l. 8. read λαμβανόμενον.

In this Dialogue.

PAge 4. line 5. read *viz. the Sacrament.*
5. l. 19. for *dont*, r. *dut.*
8. l. 30. for *fictitious*, r. *factitious.*
23. l. 22. r. *doubted as well.*

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